

Date: May 9, 2022

To: **Mayor London Breed**

Office of the Mayor - City of San Francisco

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Re: Achieving Public Safety Outcomes Through Cost-Effective Means in San Francisco

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## **Introduction**

Crime rates are rising in San Francisco. Like all state and local governments, San Francisco has a limited pool of resources with which to respond. Therefore, efficiency in public safety spending must be maximized in order to produce the greatest change in public safety outcomes per dollar. To achieve public safety outcomes through cost effective means, we recommend San Francisco: (1) delegate nonviolent crime response to other agencies and reallocate budgets accordingly, and then (2) reinvest cost savings into social services to improve the long-term policing and social environment. In this memo, we will review SFPD's budget and the literature on the efficacy of police spending/personnel. We will also explore the available evidence on the merits of increased social services spending. Finally, we will examine the specific social services San Francisco should invest in before exploring some areas of concern for the city to consider.

## **SFPD Budget: Where Does the Funding go?**

Over the past ten years, the San Francisco Police Department's budget has risen annually by roughly 15% (Males, 2022). In 2021, the budget for the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) was \$704,682,307 (Vera, 2022). Specifically, SFPD costs \$704 per resident, a 7% increase from 2012 (Males, 2022). There are nine main categories of expenditure within the police department: personnel services (89.08%), non-equipment expenses (5.59%), equipment (2.30%), capital projects (1.10%), contractual services (1.03%), programmatic projects (0.81%), contractual attorney services (0.05%), contractual forestry (0.02%), and other expenses (0.01%) (Vera, 2022).

Of the \$617,484,793 spent on personnel, 98.8% goes directly to personnel operations. Personnel operations require immense funding because it covers salaries (\$401,890,494), retirement/pensions (\$87,700,521), benefits (\$59,025,150), overtime (\$29,994,289), worker's compensation (\$22,188,448), and special pay (\$9,008,317). By contrast, personnel administration costs comprise only 1.24% (\$7,677,574) of the personnel services budget (Vera, 2022). Considering that the number of police employees has increased over the decade by roughly 21%—there are now 3.5 SFPD employees per resident in San Francisco—it makes sense that the budget has increased so dramatically (Males, 2022). SFPD's personnel expenses make it the second most expensive police department in California after Los Angeles.

## **Recommendation #1: Delegating Non-Violent Crime Response**

Studies reveal that, nationwide, state and local governments treat police departments as universal problem-solvers for the cities they serve. For even relatively minor, non-emergency incidents, the default response is a police response. As one recent analysis of 911 calls and responses across nine different agencies published in *Police Quarterly* revealed, police spend the majority of their time (63.1%) responding to areas outside of violent crime and property crime response such as traffic-related incidents, disorders (i.e., noise violations, graffiti, public intoxication,

public urination, etc.), medical/mental health crises, follow-ups and other service requests (Lum et al., 2021). Notably, Lum et al. (2021) found that officers spend more time per incident, on average, on cases they are ill-equipped to handle such as medical crises (86.5 mins per response) than on missing persons (72.5) or violent crime (63.4), areas which are more clearly within an officer's expertise and purview. These findings were consistent with those of previous literature.

Vermeer, Woods, and Jackson of the RAND Corporation summarize the issue well, characterizing the current role of police as a "One-Stop-Shop for Trying to Address Society's Problems." The authors explain "[t]he United States has many societal problems that have very different (often complex and overlapping) causes and for which effective solutions require responses from practitioners with very specialized training, expertise, and resilience." Despite this, "[a]lmost without exception, a single entity has been made the 'front line' in addressing all of these problems: the police," (Vermeer et al., 2020). Essentially, police are utilized as a single solution to everything—from mundane issues, such as parking tickets, to challenges of immense societal importance, such as drug addiction and homelessness. Such a system clearly fails its own officers. Vermeer et al. cite the work of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, noting that the multitudinous tasks officers are asked to complete "often have profound, negative effects on officer stress, mental health, and overall wellness." In far too many cases, this leads officers to take their own life; in fact, officers are more likely to die by suicide than they are to die in the line of duty (Violanti & Steege, 2021).

With this evidence in mind, our first recommendation is to reduce the scope of work expected of SFPD officers, delegating issues such as mental health incidents to other non-police agencies/programs within the wider public safety portfolio and, in turn, divert a portion of SFPD funds toward these other agencies/programs. Other cities have adopted similar approaches to community safety. Namely, the CAHOOTS program in the city of Eugene, Oregon. When a Eugene 911 dispatcher receives a mental health-related call, instead of sending police officers to the scene, the dispatcher will send in a CAHOOTS team consisting of one medic (usually a nurse or EMT) and a behavioral health-trained crisis responder. In 2019, CAHOOTS teams responded to approximately 24,000 calls, or 20% of all dispatches, with only 150 calls requiring police backup. The program is considered a major success, saving the city roughly \$8.5 million in public safety costs and \$14 million in ambulance trips and ER costs annually (Andrew, 2020). Beyond the serious financial implications, it is probable that delegating these responsibilities would ease the difficult job officers face, as explained by Vermeer et. al.:

"If some of the goals of those advocating for defunding the police are met, it should mean that some calls for service will be redirected from police to partners in their communities who are better positioned to handle certain problems. If police are more explicitly given permission to say 'no' to some of the current responsibilities that they find most problematic, it should make the job of a police officer easier, more effective, more respected, and more satisfying."

Shifting resources and responsibilities away from police departments and toward better-equipped agencies/programs not only saves money but has the potential to improve officer job satisfaction. In addition to mental health distress calls, there are numerous other roles and responsibilities that can be more efficiently delegated to other agencies (see Table 1 in the Appendix). For example, Berkeley, California recently shifted responsibility for traffic enforcement from Berkeley PD to civilian departments of transportation and reallocated budgets proportionally (Simpson, 2020).

Advocacy groups in New York City are actively pursuing similar reforms, earning the support of several NYC legislators (Transportation Alternatives, 2020).

### **Police Spending and Public Safety: An Inconclusive Investment**

The conventional argument that increased police spending/manpower yields lower crime rates is not persuasive. While several studies support the conclusion that increased police funding does in fact lead to significant reductions in violent and property crime, an equal volume of research finds no existence of such a relationship. In fact, some studies have even found that in certain environmental contexts, crime rates actually increase with increased spending. An extensive review of the literature ultimately reveals that increasing spending on police to achieve public safety outcomes is an inconclusive investment.

In their meta- and vote count-analysis for a peer-reviewed journal, Carriaga and Worrall (2015) found mixed results on the effects of police force size. The meta-analysis revealed a slight inverse relationship between policing levels and crime outcomes. However, this relationship differed across crime categories, demonstrating a larger decrease in violent crime than property crime. Specifically, the effect of increased policing levels changed depending on the type of crime such as burglary, assault, and murder. They found that the effect decreased in magnitude, lost statistical significance, and in some cases, changed direction. A vote-count analysis on these same studies found similarly mixed outcomes (Carriaga and Worrall, 2015).

Carriaga and Worrall's findings are consistent with other peer-reviewed studies that find differing effects of police spending and levels across crime types. Both Levitt (2002) and Evans and Owens (2007) found that when it came to increasing policing resources, there were more significant elasticities in the reduction of violent crime compared to property crime. Meaning that violent crime experienced a greater negative effect as policing resources went up, while property experienced a smaller effect. By contrast, researchers Klick and Tabarrok (2005) and Lin (2009) found that property crime had greater elasticity than violent crime in relation to increasing police resources. These findings suggest the importance of understanding the criminal environment of a jurisdiction before altering police budgets.

Chalfin and McCrary (2018) investigated the potential cost savings on police investments. They found that every dollar spent on police reduces victim costs by \$1.63, but their study focused on violent crimes only. The researchers explained that "reductions in property crime are simply not sufficiently costly to justify the expense of additional police officers. Violent crimes, however, are extremely costly; consequently, even relatively small effects of police on violent crime would be sufficient to justify additional investment in police" (Chalfin and McCrary, 2018). If a city's goal is to reduce violent crime, then a police investment seems sound, but there may not be enough justification if the goal is to target property crime. The strength of this finding varies across policing environments.

Several studies explore how the environment influences the efficacy of police spending for public safety. Atems (2019) found a relatively small inverse between police spending and crime rates. Specifically, as police spending increased by 1%, property and violent crime went down by 0.1% (Atems, 2019). However, the effect of police spending on crime rates heavily depended on the local environment and flattened out over time. In particular, the effect was more significant in localities with high levels of preexisting crime as opposed to low crime jurisdictions (Atems, 2019). The effects were also susceptible to education level, inequality (i.e., wealth gaps), and

racial makeup. Atems (2019) acknowledged that his findings are consistent with only half the relevant literature on police spending and public safety.

In their working paper for the National Bureau of Economic Research, Chalfin et al. (2020) explored the effects of police force size on crime rates, while considering the civilian race of a city. The team found that if a police force added an additional officer to their ranks, it was associated with a 0.003 - 0.006 reduction in homicide rate per 100,000 residents. This means that in order to save a single additional life in a year, a city would need to bring on 10 to 17 new officers (Chalfin et al., 2020). They also found that adding an additional officer affected reducing other violent crimes such as robbery, assault, and rape. However, these findings are contingent on a city's racial composition. Cities with a higher percentage of Black individuals experienced no reduction in violent crime rates compared to cities with smaller Black populations (Chalfin et al., 2020). The impact of increasing policing levels is not universal and depends on the environment of a given locality.

Kleck and Barnes (2014) found little to no empirical evidence on the deterrence hypothesis, which posits that the greater the size of a police force, the lower the probability of criminal behavior. Ultimately, they concluded that the "negative associations found between either arrest rates or police strength measures and crime rates in macro-level studies should not be regarded as evidence of the general deterrent effect of arrest rates on crime rates since higher arrest and police manpower levels do not appear to produce higher perceived legal risks" (Kleck and Barnes, 2014). They argue that while increasing police force size is correlated with higher arrest rates, it does not reduce the factors that lead people to commit crimes and, therefore, cannot be understood as an effective crime reduction tool.

Overall, these studies demonstrate the inconsistent relationship between police spending and size and public safety. Before making budgetary decisions, cities should consider other factors such as what type of crime they wish to reduce, the level of crime within the city, and the city's overall environment. While police levels and spending can influence a city's crime rate, it is misguided to assume that increasing police size and funds will guarantee crime reduction cost effectively or at all.

### **Social Service Spending and Public Safety: A Clearer Investment**

Unlike spending on police, funding social services is clearly tied to crime reduction. Heller (2014) found that "[i]n a randomized controlled trial among 1,634 disadvantaged high school youth in Chicago, assignment to a summer jobs program decrease[d] violence by 43% over 16 months (3.95 fewer violent-crime arrests per 100 youth)." Sipsma et al. (2020) uncovered similar effects on state-level violent crime rates, concluding that "every \$10,000 increase in spending per person living in poverty was associated with 0.87 fewer homicides per 100,000 population," which is roughly equivalent to a 16% decrease in the average homicide rate.

In a report for the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Bondurant et al. (2016) investigated the relationship between increased spending on drug rehabilitation and public safety outcomes. The authors found that one substance abuse treatment (SAT) facility was associated with a 0.14% reduction in overall crime, which translates to a \$700,000 reduction in the associated social cost of crime (Bondurant et al., 2016). These benefits fluctuate across crime types. For instance, an additional SAT facility reduces the social costs associated with financially-motivated crime by 0.07% annually, which roughly translates to an annual \$60,000

decrease in the social costs of financially-motivated crimes (Bondurant et al., 2016). Whereas one additional SAT facility marks a 0.15% decline in the social costs associated with violent crime, suggesting that an additional treatment facility decreases the cost of violent crime by approximately \$615,000 annually (Bondurant et al., 2016).

Emphasizing the connection between financial desperation and crime rates, a joint report from NBER and Harvard found that states with early payment models for welfare programs witnessed a 3.7% reduction in crime during the first 10 days of the month (Foley, 2008). However, crime rates in early payment states slowly and consistently increased to normal or heightened levels after this initial grace period (Foley, 2008). By contrast, in states with staggered payment systems, the report found no temporal patterns in crime rate, concluding that financial desperation is a central driver of criminal behavior (Foley, 2008). Because the available literature provides a clear consensus on the benefits of social service funding, we recommend San Francisco invest in its social services for long-term public safety outcomes.

By improving its social service landscape, the Bay Area can address the systemic inequities that lead to crime, especially financially-motivated crime, which San Francisco particularly suffers from.

### **What is Crime Like In San Francisco?**

Crime in San Francisco has steadily risen from 2020 to 2021. However, it has not risen in equal measure. Within San Francisco, overall crime rose by roughly 13.3% with the city experiencing 5,942 more crime incidents than it did the year prior (SFPD Crime Dashboard, 2021). However, this increase is primarily fueled by an uptick in property crime within the city. Property crime rose 14.82% from the previous year by 5,885 incidents. This increase in property crime contributes to 99% of the change in overall crime, with violent crime only contributing to less than 1% (SFPD Crime Dashboard, 2021). Violent crime changed by 1.01%, as violent crimes increased by 49 incidents. There were two significant outliers within both categories of crime. For property crime, larceny-theft saw the most significant change, as it rose by 24.1% or a difference of 6,184 incidents from the prior year (SFPD Crime Dashboard, 2021). Crime analysts attribute this increase to higher rates of shoplifting, which skyrocketed over the past year (Neilson, 2022).

San Francisco is currently facing one of its historic low points in violent crime, even though homicides are rising slightly. Compared to other California cities, San Francisco ranks fifth out of ten, with Oakland and Los Angeles taking first and second place, respectively (Neilson, 2022). However, San Francisco has the second-highest rate behind Oakland in property crime. Some researchers believe that the Bay Area's high income inequality is driving property theft rates (Neilson, 2022). The pandemic exacerbated income inequality within the city. Because property crime has increased in wealthier neighborhoods that border low-income areas, analysts have emphasized the role of financial desperation in criminal activity (Neilson, 2022).

### **Recommendation #2: Investing in Social Services**

#### ***Affordable Housing***

San Francisco is experiencing a housing crisis. After enjoying a period of immense economic growth, which attracted new residents to the area, the city was unable to meet the demand for housing. As a result, San Franciscans pay high rental prices and even higher home prices. In 2021, the rental cost of a one-bedroom apartment averaged at \$2,660 per month and the median

single-family home price in the city reached \$1.63 million (Canon, 2021). Although the pandemic prompted a 24% decrease in housing costs, it also exacerbated the financial instability of Bay Area residents, worsening an already precarious housing situation (Canon, 2021). Low-income renters and homeowners did not benefit from work-from-home policies and, therefore, were unable to lower their rental rates or purchase new homes with extremely low interest rates (Canon, 2021). Consequently, low-income individuals and families bear the brunt of the post-pandemic housing shortage. According to the city's affordable housing report, the Bay Area only has 35 affordable units for every 100 low-income households in San Francisco (Kendall, 2021). Without affordable housing, low-income families and members of the unhoused population fall into at-risk categories as both perpetrators and victims of crime.

To combat rising crime, San Francisco should transfer police funding to affordable housing opportunities. In 2018, San Francisco passed a homelessness prevention proposition, which established the Our City, Our Home fund (Yes on C, 2018). The proposition mandates that 50% of the \$150 million go toward housing (Yes on C, 2018). However, the city estimates that this funding will only pay for the construction, rehab, prevention, and operating subsidies of approximately 4,000 units of housing over the next eight years (Yes on C, 2018). Housing priority will be given to families and youth (Yes on C, 2018). Unfortunately, according to the National Low Income Housing Coalition, San Francisco requires at least 160,000 additional units of affordable housing in order to stabilize its unhoused and low-income populations (Aurand et al., 2021). In anticipation of this fund, the Department of Homelessness and Supportive Housing has decreased its budget for fiscal year 2021-2022 by 21.2% (Office of Mayor Breed, 2020). Combined with the inadequate funding from the Our City, Our Home initiative, this budget decrease presents a significant challenge to affordable housing in San Francisco. San Francisco's city government should better invest in safer and more equitable housing opportunities for its lowest income and unhoused citizens.

The impact of stable housing on crime is well-documented. Diamond and McQuade (2016), researchers from Stanford Business School, found that introducing affordable housing to poor communities increases house prices by 6.5%, lowers crime rates, and attracts racially- and income-diverse populations. Specifically, subsidized housing lowers violent and property crime rates in low-income communities (Diamond & McQuade, 2016). A similar study conducted by Freedman and Owens (2011), researchers from Princeton University, reported significant reductions in violent crime with low-income housing development and associated revitalization of communities. Ellen et al. (2013) discovered that higher foreclosure rates are associated with higher property crime rates, concluding that housing stability is tied to crime reduction. If San Francisco shifts funding priorities from police districts to affordable housing, it can achieve the same crime reduction goals while addressing systemic housing inequities for minority communities.

### ***Homelessness & Drug Rehabilitation***

The Bay Area must also contend with its growing unhoused population, which suffers from drug addiction. Homelessness increased in Alameda County and Santa Clara County by 43% and 31% between 2017 and 2019 (Kendall, 2021). In general, the unhoused population in San Francisco rose more than 30% within the same two-year time frame (City of San Francisco, 2021). Housing experts attribute this growth to the housing shortage, which adversely impacts people with low-wage jobs as well as disabled and unemployed individuals. However, public health



advocates argue that San Francisco is facing a drug-use crisis, which fuels high rates of homelessness. High-risk districts like the Tenderloin account for the majority of the city's annual drug overdose fatalities and routinely report more incidents of street crime than in lower-risk districts with smaller unhoused populations (Westervelt, 2022). Without evidence-based drug rehabilitation programs, San Francisco cannot effectively aid its unhoused residents.

San Francisco should supplement its housing initiatives with viable drug rehabilitation programs. Currently, the city primarily relies on a statewide homelessness prevention program called Project Roomkey to solve its homelessness crisis. The program focuses on increasing shelter capacity to reduce the rate of unsheltered homelessness (Department of Social Services, n.d.). However, Project Roomkey hotels do not offer addiction recovery treatment or mental health care—two vital components of drug rehabilitation. In her proposed budget for fiscal year 2021-2022, Mayor London Breed announced \$13.5 million toward overdose treatment for the unhoused (Office of Mayor Breed, 2020). This money represents a fraction of the city's budget for homelessness reduction, which is primarily targeted toward shelter hotels and preventative homelessness services. The Bay Area should increase funding for evidence-based drug rehabilitation programs to improve outcomes for its unhoused population.

Relevant literature often highlights substance abuse as a community determinant of crime. French et al. (2000) found that areas with higher concentrations of frequent drug users also reported greater criminal activity, namely property crime. The study clarifies recreational drug users from frequent drug users, concluding that the frequency of drug usage strengthens the relationship between crime and drug use (French et al., 2000). Simpson (2003) reinforces this finding, also emphasizing the difference between casual and frequent drug users and the disparate intensities of their relationship to crime. By investing in drug rehabilitation programs for the unhoused, San Francisco can achieve its crime reduction goals while buffering minority community members from race-based police violence.

### **Areas of Concern**

This memorandum primarily concerns recommendations for shifting responsibilities and funding priorities from SFPD to other relevant government agencies and social services. However, we have highlighted several areas of concern for the mayor's office to consider in its efforts to address crime reduction goals:

1. **Affordable Housing Availability.** In our social services recommendation, we urge San Francisco to increase its spending on affordable housing. However, we do not offer concrete solutions to increasing the availability of affordable housing units. San Francisco currently has strict zoning laws that hinder the construction of affordable housing units. The city subscribes to "local control," allowing neighborhood groups to oversee zoning and development (Oatman-Stanford, 2018). With this power, wealthier neighborhoods establish exclusionary zoning laws to prevent the construction of multifamily housing, redevelopment of low-income neighborhoods, and merging of poor and rich communities (Oatman-Stanford, 2018). San Francisco's housing shortage is not the result of a lack of land. The city government must reclaim its zoning authority and use it to promote affordable housing opportunities.
2. **Crime Statistics.** We use crime statistics from the SFPD database in our memo. However, we acknowledge the growing body of scholarly literature that questions the

integrity of police-reported crime data. Recently, there has been a paradigm shift within the police profession to use techniques such as Compstat to increase police efficacy and emphasize data-driven policing. However, all quantitative measures are susceptible to data manipulation (Eterno et al., 2014). In 2010, a whistleblower at the NYPD created a report about crime statistic manipulation, which revealed that the department had frequently manipulated crime statistics to artificially meet crime reduction benchmarks (Francescani, 2012). NYPD's lack of transparency helped facilitate the cover-up as they would deny requests from non-partisan researchers and organizations to browse their official records or verify crime statistic information (Eterno et al., 2014).

While manipulation and corruption of crime statistics are real threats, it is hard to gauge the magnitude of the threat. Research into this area is scant at best with outside researchers only just entering this field of study (Eterno et al., 2014). It is quite possible that the crime statistics provided by the SFPD have been manipulated in some shape or form, as there have been documented instances of transparency issues regarding youth arrests. For roughly 90% of youth arrests, SFPD failed to document specific charges or describe the events that precipitated an arrest (Males, 2018). We encourage the city to investigate methods of improving SFPD data transparency and ethics to reinvigorate public confidence in SFPD's crime reporting.

3. **Balancing Investments.** In our second recommendation, we propose that San Francisco shift funding priorities from SFPD to social services, namely affordable housing and drug rehabilitation for the unhoused. However, we do not specify how much money the city should earmark for investment. Cities have limited budgets to spend on public services. Consequently, we recommend San Francisco conduct a cost-benefit analysis of a police versus a social service investment to determine which method for achieving public safety is the most beneficial to the city. In that CBA, we encourage San Francisco to consider the value of developing systemic solutions to community safety.

## Conclusion

To better serve its residents, San Francisco should shift responsibilities and funding priorities away from the San Francisco Police Department. Most of SFPD's budget goes toward personnel, but the majority of personnel time is spent responding to nonviolent crimes such as mental health/medical emergencies and traffic enforcement. Similar to other cities' police reform efforts, San Francisco should delegate nonviolent crime response to civilian and government agencies with specialized training; they should then reallocate budgets proportionally. By shifting the responsibility for nonviolent crime, San Francisco could potentially accrue millions in cost savings. The city can then use the cost savings from this first policy change to better fund its key social services: affordable housing and drug rehabilitation among the unhoused. If the relationship between police spending/size and crime reduction is inconclusive, then we recommend San Francisco invest in social services to help improve the social and policing environment long term. Investing in social services has well-documented anti-crime effects insofar as it addresses the systemic nature of crime—especially financially-motivated crime, which San Francisco currently suffers from. We believe San Francisco can achieve public safety outcomes through cost effective means if it can shift both responsibilities and funding priorities from SFPD to relevant agencies and social service programs.



## Appendix

**Table 1 - Reproduced from Vermeer et al.**

Example Policing Functions for Reallocation			
Policing Issues	Strategy with Lesser Enforcement Role	Example(s)	Source(s)
Homelessness	Homeless Outreach Teams  Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD)  Housing interventions	Chula Vista Homeless Outreach Teams; Seattle Navigation Teams; Community Outreach Resource Program, Indio, California  Seattle LEAD Program  Permanent Supportive Housing programs	Gonzalez, 2019; Jones, 2019; Martinez and Telep, 2017  Collins, Lonczak, and Clifasefi, 2019  NASEM, 2018
Behavioral health	Community-based behavioral health crisis response  Police-assisted substance use treatment  Police–mental health collaboratives	Crisis Assistance Helping Out on the Streets (CAHOOTS)  Police Assisted Addiction and Recovery Initiative Angel initiatives  Crisis Intervention Teams; Co-Responder Programs	White Bird Clinic, 2020  Schiff et al., 2017  Zauhar, 2019
Community violence	Violence prevention initiatives  Community development  Advance counseling and mentoring for at-risk youth	Cure Violence  Local nonprofit organizations  Becoming a Man	Delgado et al., 2017; Slutkin and Ransford, 2020  Sharkey, Torrats, Espinosa, and Takyar, 2017  Heller et al., 2017
School safety	Early intervention and	Positive Behavioral	Horner, Sugai, and

	prevention	Interventions and Supports  Threat assessment and prevention	Anderson, 2010; Mitchell et al., 2017  U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center, 2019
Dispute resolution	Coordinated community response models	Domestic Violence Enhanced Response Team (DVERT), Colorado Springs, Colorado	Reuland et al., 2006; Uchida et al., 2001
Traffic enforcement	Shift responsibility to civilian departments of transportation	Transportation Alternatives, New York; Berkeley Department of Transportation	Transportation Alternatives, 2020; Simpson, 2020

## References

Andrew, S. (2020, July 5). This town of 170,000 replaced some cops with medics and mental health workers. It's worked for over 30 years. *CNN*.

<https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/05/us/cahoots-replace-police-mental-health-trnd/index.html>

This report on the CAHOOTS program in Eugene, Oregon examines the program's overall effectiveness and cost-savings for the city.

Atems, B. (2019). An empirical characterization of the dynamic effects of police spending on violent and property crime. *Economic Inquiry*, 58(2), 717-744.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12866>

This peer reviewed article looks at the relationship between spending shocks and crim rates. What was found was there was a statistically significant negative relationship between police spending shocks and crime rates, however, this was dependent on the environment of the city in question. This article gave us greater insight into how environment plays a pivotal role in crime reduction efforts when it comes to policing.

Aurand, A., Emmanuel, D., Threet, D., Rafi, I., & Yentel, D. (2021). The gap: A shortage of affordable homes. *The National Low Income Housing Coalition*.

[https://reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/gap/Gap-Report\\_2021.pdf](https://reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/gap/Gap-Report_2021.pdf)

The National Low Income Housing Coalition conducted a national analysis of affordable housing. The report concluded that there is a significant shortage of affordable housing options in low-income communities.

Bondurant, S.R., Lindo, J.M.M & Swensen I.D. (2016). Substance abuse treatment centers and local crime. *National Bureau of Economic Research*.

[https://www.nber.org/system/files/working\\_papers/w22610/w22610.pdf](https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w22610/w22610.pdf)

Bondurant et al. explores the relationship between drug rehabilitation programs and subsequent changes in the associated social cost of crime. Ultimately, they find significant cost savings associated with an additional substance abuse treatment facility for both violent and property crime.

Canon, G. (2021, January 9). San Francisco rents are plummeting - But its housing crisis could get worse. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jan/09/san-francisco-rents-housing-crisis-covid-pandemic>

In her article for The Guardian, Canon investigates the paradox between falling rental rates and rising housing shortage. She concludes that the Bay Area would need to expand its housing units by nearly 500,000 in order to make a dent in San Francisco's housing crisis.

Carriaga, M. L., & Worrall, J. L. (2015). Police levels and crime. *The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles*, 88(4), 315–333.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/0032258x15612702>

This peer reviewed study delves into an overview analysis of many different policing studies on crime rates and policing levels. The researchers show that there is a minor negative influence of policing levels on crime rates, that in some cases this influence is not consistent.

Chalfin, A., & McCrary, J. (2018). Are U.S. cities underpoliced? theory and evidence. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 100(1), 167–186.  
[https://doi.org/10.1162/rest\\_a\\_00694](https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00694)

This peer reviewed study gives strong specific insight into the relationship between police spending and crime rates. What it showed was that while it is more cost effective to add officers to localities with high violent crime and wished to reduce it, the researcher deemed that property crime in of itself does not justify adding an extra police officer.

Chalfin, A., Hansen, B., Weisburst, E., & Williams, M. (2020). Police force size and civilian race. *NBER*. <https://doi.org/10.3386/w28202>

This working paper from a peer reviewed journal looks at the effect policing levels have on crime rates but now takes into consideration the racial make up of a city. What was found that cities that had lower percentages of black individuals experienced a reduction in the number of violent crimes, particularly murders. However, in cities that had higher percentages of black individuals there was no effect what so ever.

Crime dashboard. (2021, October 5). *San Francisco Police Department*. Retrieved April 26, 2022, from <https://www.sanfranciscopolice.org/stay-safe/crime-data/crime-dashboard>

This is the SFPD's crime dashboard that shows the crime statistics from 2021 to the year prior. This was pivotal in understanding what type of crime San Francisco is actually dealing with, and to what severity.

Department of Social Services. (n.d.) Project Roomkey/housing and homelessness COVID response. *Government of California*. <https://www.cdss.ca.gov/inforesources/cdss-programs/housing-programs/project-roomkey>

This webpage provides an overview of California state's homelessness prevention efforts during COVID-19. The governor signed Project Roomkey into law at the beginning of the pandemic. The program attempts to solve homelessness by providing shelter-in-place hotels for unhoused citizens to lodge in.

Diamond, R., & McQuade, T. (2016). Who wants affordable housing in their backyard? An equilibrium analysis of low income property development. *Journal of Political Economy*, 127(3). [https://www.nber.org/system/files/working\\_papers/w22204/w22204.pdf](https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w22204/w22204.pdf)

Researchers Diamond and McQuade explore the benefits of low income property development. In their article, they conclude that LIHTC development yields neighborhood income diversity and reduces overall crime rates in a community.

Ellen, I.G., Laco, J., & Sharygin, C.A. (2013). Do foreclosures cause crime? *Journal of Urban Economics*, 74(C), 59-70. [10.1016/j.jue.2012.09.003](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2012.09.003)

Ellen et al. conduct an analysis of community health in the wake of mortgage foreclosures. They conclude that the higher the percentage of foreclosures in a neighborhood, the higher the overall crime rate. Specifically, foreclosures are associated with higher property crime rates.

Eterno, J. A., Verma, A., & Silverman, E. B. (2014). Police manipulations of crime reporting: Insiders' revelations. *Justice Quarterly*, 33(5), 811–835.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2014.980838>

This peer reviewed study delves into the uncertainty of crime statistics as they are susceptible for manipulation, such was the case for NYPD, however, explains that there is not a great deal of research on this subject so we do not know for certain the magnitude of the threat. We used this article primarily to caution those reading this memo about the trustworthiness of the crime statistics provided to us from the SFPD.

Evans, W. N., & Owens, E. G. (2007). Cops and crime. *Journal of Public Economics*, 91(1-2), 181–201. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.05.014>

This peer reviewed journal which looked into how policing levels affects violent crime rates, was used to show that some researchers found increasing policing levels affected violent crime more than property crime.

Foley, F.C. (2008). Welfare payments and crime. *Harvard University and National Bureau of Economic Research*.  
[https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/Intellectual\\_Life/FoleyCrimeFeb08\\_\(2\).pdf](https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/FoleyCrimeFeb08_(2).pdf)

Foley et al. analyze the connection between welfare payment cycles and crime patterns at the state level in the United States. They conclude that financial desperation is a central driver of criminal behavior.

Francescani, C. (2012, March 9). *NYPD report confirms manipulation of crime stats*. Reuters. Retrieved May 5, 2022, from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-crime-newyork-statistics/nypd-report-confirms-manipulation-of-crime-stats-idUSBRE82818620120309>

This is an article from Reuters that goes in depth about the crime stats manipulation scandal that plagued NYPD in 2012. We used this article to understand the possible threats to the validity of crime statistics.

Freedman, M., & Owens, E.G. (2011). Low-income housing development and crime. *Journal of Urban Economics*, 70(2-3), 115-131. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2011.04.001>

Freedman and Owens examine the effect of low-income housing development through the LIHTC program on local crime. They find that LIHTC developments are associated with lower violent crime rates but cannot conclude its effects on property crime.

French, M.T., McGeary, K.A., Chitwood, D.D., McCoy, C.B., Inciardi, J.A., & McBride, D. (2000). Chronic drug use and crime. *Springer: Substance Abuse*, 21, 95-109.  
<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1007763129628>



French et al. investigate the connection between drug use and crime. The study found that the frequency of drug use has the greatest overall impact on predictive crime patterns. The higher the concentration of frequent drug users, the higher the overall property crime—specifically, violent and property crime.

Heller, S. B. (2014). Summer jobs reduce violence among disadvantaged youth. *Science*, 346(6214), 1219–1223.

This study of a summer jobs program in Chicago shows a strong effect on violent crime reduction.

Kendall, M. (2021, March 18). How can we solve the Bay Area housing crisis? Build 160,000 affordable homes. *The Mercury News*. <https://www.mercurynews.com/2021/03/18/how-can-we-solve-the-bay-area-housing-crisis-build-160000-affordable-homes/>

In this article for The Mercury News, Kendall analyzes the results of the NLIHC's report on affordable housing in San Francisco. She emphasizes that, in order to resolve the housing crisis, the Bay Area needs to build at least 160,000 units of affordable housing for its at-risk and unhoused populations.

Kleck, G., & Barnes, J. C. (2014). Do More Police Lead to More Crime Deterrence? *Crime & Delinquency*, 60(5), 716–738. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0011128710382263>

This peer reviewed study goes into the deterrence hypothesis that is key for the conventional argument that more police officers deter crime from rising, as it makes individuals weigh the costs and benefits of committing the crime. What the study shows is that adding more police does not have a great impact on individuals risk assessment for when they consider committing a crime.

Klick, J., & Tabarrok, A. (2005). Using terror alert levels to estimate the effect of police on crime. *The Journal of Law and Economics*, 48(1), 267–279. <https://doi.org/10.1086/426877>

This peer reviewed journal which looked into how changes in the terror alert level set by the Department of Homeland Security provide a shock to police presence and how this affected crime rates, was used to show that some researchers found increasing policing levels affected property crime more than violent crime.

Levitt, S. D. (2002). Using electoral cycles in police hiring to estimate the effects of police on crime: Reply. *American Economic Review*, 92(4), 1244–1250. <https://doi.org/10.1257/00028280260344777>

This peer reviewed journal which looked into how electoral cycles influence policing levels, was used to show that some researchers found increasing policing levels affected violent crime more than property crime.

Lin, M.-J. (2009). More police, less crime: Evidence from US State Data. *International Review of Law and Economics*, 29(2), 73–80. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2008.12.003>

This peer reviewed journal which looked into how policing levels affects overall crime rates, was used to show that some researchers found increasing policing levels affected property crime more than violent crime.

Lum, C., Koper, C. S., & Wu, X. (2021). Can We Really Defund the Police? A Nine-Agency Study of Police Response to Calls for Service. *Police Quarterly*, 10986111211035002.

This study examined 911 calls and responses from nine agencies in the U.S., providing an in-depth look at how police agencies actually spend their time. Crucially, more than half of officer time was spent responding to non-violent crime, such as traffic incidents.

Males, M. (2018, December 6). San Francisco police fail to specify charges in nearly 90 percent of youth arrests in 2017. *Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice*.  
<http://www.cjcj.org/news/12363>

We used this reference to showcase how the SFPD are negligent in their duties to list the reasons they are charging individuals with why they are being arrested. Specifically they are faulty in their duties towards youth who commit crimes.

Males, M. (2022, March). San Franciscans spend more and get less from their police department than most major California cities. *Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice*.  
[http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/san\\_franciscans\\_spend\\_more\\_get\\_less\\_from\\_their\\_police\\_dept.pdf](http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/san_franciscans_spend_more_get_less_from_their_police_dept.pdf)

This reference was a report done by the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice that shows the disparity between how much the citizens of San Francisco pay for their police service and the quality of the service. It shows how there are stark and concerning differences when compared to other police services around California, especially the other major Cities.

Neilson, S. (2022, February 12). Crime trends are diverging in S.F.'s rich and poor neighborhoods. these maps show the stark contrast. *San Francisco Chronicle*.  
<https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/Crime-trends-SF-neighborhoods-16833205.php>

This is a San Francisco Chronicle article that delves into what may be driving the property crime in the city, and it shows where the crime is happening on a geographic basis. What can be gleaned from the article is that crime is occurring in wealthier neighborhoods and not poorer ones.

Neilson, S. (2022, April 13). San Francisco crime rates drastically shifted in the pandemic. *San Francisco Chronicle*. <https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/San-Francisco-crime-rate-17065509.php>

This is a San Francisco Chronicle article that delves into what may be driving the property crime in the city, and discusses what is driving the rise in larceny theft the most.

Oatman-Stanford, H. (2018, September 28). The bad design that created one of America's worst housing crises. *Fast Company*. <https://www.fastcompany.com/90242388/the-bad-design-that-created-one-of-americas-worst-housing-crises>

This article reviews the history of San Francisco's zoning laws. It uncovers the racist origins of the city's current housing crisis as facilitated by zoning statutes.

Office of Mayor Breed. (2020). Proposed budget: Fiscal years 2021-2022 and 2022-2023.

*Mayor's Office of Public Policy and Finance.*

<https://sfmayor.org/sites/default/files/FY22%20and%20FY23%20Budget%20Book%20Final%20for%20Web.pdf>

This source is Mayor Breed's proposed budget for fiscal years 2021-2022 and 2022-2023. In it, she emphasizes the following budgeting priorities for San Francisco: homelessness prevention, affordable housing, economic revitalization, COVID-19 recovery, and drug rehabilitation.

San Francisco, CA. Vera Institute of Justice. (n.d.). Retrieved April 26, 2022, from <https://www.vera.org/publications/what-policing-costs-in-americas-biggest-cities/san-francisco-ca>

We used this resource to quickly and effectively delve into the budget of the police, to understand where a majority of their money is spent.

Simpson, B. (2020, July 17). Berkeley approves goals to cut police budget by 50%, reduce cops' role in traffic enforcement. *Chronicle*.

<https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/Berkeley-council-bans-police-from-traffic-15410326.php>

The City of Berkeley approved a plan to cut Berkeley PD's budget by 50% and shuttle these funds to civilian traffic enforcement.

Simpson, M. (2003). The relationship between drug use and crime: A puzzle inside an enigma.

*International Journal of Drug Policy*, 14(4), 307-319. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0955-3959\(03\)00081-1](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0955-3959(03)00081-1)

Simpson explores the relationship between different kinds of drug use and crime rates. In his research, Simpson discovers a third form of drug use known as episodic drug, which is highly correlated with increased crime rates.

Transportation Alternatives. (2020, June 19). NYC Must Reimagine Traffic Enforcement.

*Transportation Alternatives*. <https://www.transalt.org/press-releases/nyc-must-reimagine-traffic-enforcement>

This report by advocacy group Transportation Alternatives makes an evidence-based case for shifting funds from NYPD to DOT. Notably, the report has secured the backing of several key NYC legislators.

Vermeer, M. J. D., Woods, D., & Jackson, B. A. (2020). *Probably—If Communities Ask Police to Solve Fewer Problems*. RAND Corporation. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26518>

This report features insights from interviews with dozens of members of law enforcement across the country, an analysis of the major issues in U.S. policing, a review of proposed police reforms and supporting evidence, and an evaluation of public support and support among law

enforcement for these reforms.

Violanti, J. M., & Steege, A. (2021). Law enforcement worker suicide: an updated national assessment. *Policing*, 44(1), 18–31.

The latest statistics on suicide among members of law enforcement. Crucially, members of law enforcement are more likely to die by suicide than they are on the job.

Westervelt, E. (2022, February 5). Overdoses far exceed COVID deaths in a San Francisco district. The mayor has a plan. *NPR*. <https://www.npr.org/2022/02/05/1076830470/san-francisco-mayor-homelessness-tenderloin-district>

In his article for NPR, Westervelt gives an overview of San Francisco's drug crisis. Specifically, he explores drug usage among the unhoused in high-risk districts such as the Tenderloin. He also examines the mayor's proposed plans for reducing drug use within the city.

Yes on C. (2018). Proposition C - Our City, Our Home: Implementation plan. *Our City, Our Home*. [https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/ourcityourhomesf/pages/73/attachments/original/1538167166/Prop\\_C - The Plan.pdf](https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/ourcityourhomesf/pages/73/attachments/original/1538167166/Prop_C_-_The_Plan.pdf)

This proposition includes an overview of the Our City, Our Home implementation plan and objectives. The policy addresses homelessness prevention, drug use among the unhoused, affordable housing for the unhoused, and mental health services for the unhoused. It also provides funding information for the program.